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One of the general tasks of the European Community is
the establishment of the common market.1 An impor-
tant tool through which the Community acts in achiev-
ing this goal is development of competition policy that
adheres to the principles of open market economy with
free competition. The European Community Treaty
recognises the creation of ‘‘a system ensuring that
competition within internal market2 is not distorted’’, as
a specific objective to be pursued within a framework of
the general task.3
When undertakings engage in anti-competitive behav-
iour by cartels they might be considered to distort the
competition, undermining the attainment of the Com-
munity objectives. The principal tool to control this
behaviour in the Community is Art.81 of the Treaty
implemented by Reg.17.4 Article 81(1) provides that
cartels, which subjectively intend (have as their object)
or objectively cause (have as their effect) distortion of
competition in internal market, are prohibited, and
therefore null and void under Art.81(2). However, such
illegal cartels may be declared legal and enforceable
under Art.81(3).
Regulation 17 provides, inter alia, the procedure for
exempting cartels from the application of Art.81(2) of
the Treaty. Accordingly, the undertakings may notify
their restrictive practices to the Commission with the
purpose of obtaining exemption under Art.81(3). The
Commission then investigates notifications and makes
decision to authorise the agreement under Art.81(3) or
prohibit it under Art.81(1) and (2) of the Treaty, as the
case may be.5 If granted, authorisation renders agree-
ments legally enforceable and provides them immunity
from fines. Whereas the prohibition and nullity provi-
sions of Art.81 are directly applicable and enforceable at
Member State level, the power to apply exemption
provision rests exclusively with the Commission.
These enforcement procedures have not significantly
changed since 1962. Rules were well suited for the early
Community with six Member States in which competi-
tion law was just developing. There was little competi-
tion culture and the Commission was able to
concentrate on creating a new system in proactive way.
Centralisation of prior authorisation was a useful way
to enable the Commission to receive information on
different markets and to develop competition policy
accordingly. It was also useful for undertakings that
needed a confirmation on the compatibility of their
agreements with the Community competition rules.
The system, however, is no longer suitable. In the
Community with 15 Member States, 11 official lan-
guages, 380 million people, and enlargement on the
way, it is not possible to maintain centralised system of
prior authorisation.6 With regard to undertakings the
notification procedure has become too timely and costly,
imposing a lot of bureaucratic requirements. The
administrative burden imposed on the Commission by
notifications prevented it from concentrating on the
most flagrant infringements of the competition rules,
which are naturally never notified. Hence, many restric-
tive agreements or practices between undertakings went
undetected and as such posed a threat to the free
competition in the internal market. Therefore, the cen-
tralised system of prior notification and authorisation
under Reg.17 no longer serves the purpose of effective
supervision of competition, and it is often described as a
poor tool in enforcement of antitrust law.
With a view to making Community competition rules
* The author would like to thank Mr Klaus Viitanen, Senior
Lecturer at Helsinki University, for his review and comments on
this article.
1 See Art.2 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
(formerly the European Economic Community) 1957, as
amended (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘the Treaty’’ or ‘‘EC
Treaty’’).
2 For definition of the internal market see Art.14(2) of the
Treaty.
3 See Art.3(1)(g) of the Treaty.
4 Council Reg.17: First Regulation implementing Arts 85 and
86 [now 81 and 82] of the Treaty [1962] O.J. 13/204, as
amended.
5 The decision focuses on weighing pro-competitive and anti-
competitive sides of the agreements.
6 White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing
Arts 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty [1999] O.J. C132/1.
more efficient the Commission has taken radical steps in
suggesting amendments to the above described system.
Proposed amendments were adopted by the European
Council in Reg.1/20037 which will soon replace
Reg.17.8 The core objective of the new Regulation is to
stop wasting the resources and make a better use of
them, to create more efficient system capable of ensuring
effective protection of the competition in internal mar-
ket, and to be able to meet future challenges. The very
idea of the reform is the switch from prior notification
and authorisation system based on ex ante control to
the directly applicable exemption system based on ex
post control. The logical consequence of this is the
abolishment of the Commission monopoly over the
application of exemption provision and its decentralisa-
tion to the Member State level, namely to the national
competition authorities and national courts, followed
by deregulation. All enforcers of antitrust law will
acquire new functions and obligations, which means
redistribution and redefinition of their respective pow-
ers. Most importantly, however, the new system of ex
post enforcement allows the Commission to refocus its
resources and take a pro active stand in the modernisa-
tion and implementation of the Community antitrust
rules, thus providing effective protection of the competi-
tion in the internal market.
Nevertheless, the new Regulation has been heavily
criticised as of its early stages.9 Prevailing among critics
is the fear of inconsistent enforcement and a loss of legal
certainty in the Community. In other words, decentral-
isation of the application of Art.81(3) to national level is
feared to impede uniformity of interpretation and lead
to divergent decision making, which would in turn
threaten preservation of the unity and coherence of the
system entailing a loss of legal certainty for under-
takings. Interestingly, the European Parliament and the
Economic and Social Committee that have been gen-
erally supportive of the Commission’s initiative also
expressed this concern.10
However, the present author believes that the regime
under the new Regulation poses no serious reason for
such concerns. Whereas the application of the law in the
proposed decentralised system might present a potential
source of inconsistency, it is incapable of producing such
magnitude to interfere with the effective functioning of
the overall system.
This article provides three arguments to support this
view. The first two arguments show that level of con-
sistency needed for the effective functioning of the new
system can be ensured through the existing and envis-
aged mechanisms, taking into consideration, in partic-
ular, highly centralised regulatory and law making
powers. The third argument demonstrates that even far
higher level of inconsistency in the United States anti-
trust enforcement is incapable of disintegrating other-
wise well co-ordinated system.
Centralisation of law and policy-making
powers in the Commission: a strong
mechanism for consistency
In the context of this and the following section, a valid
argument would have to contain a justification of the
high degree of centralisation, before moving on to the
discussion on how this mechanism contributes towards
uniformity.
Justification
Regardless of the high degree of centralisation, the
Commission in fact remains just one of the enforcers of
the Community competition rules. However, unlike all
other enforcers it retains a special responsibility for the
successful functioning of the entire system. In order to
be able to carry out its tasks of an institution entrusted
with defining and implementing Community competi-
tion policy, it is necessary to allow the Commission a
sufficiently wide discretion and high powers, as con-
firmed in the recent Court’s case law in Masterfoods.11
Furthermore, logic dictates that if decentralisation of
application is a problem for consistency then central-
isation of control is a solution. Having considered this
as a necessary response to the reinforcement of the
system of parallel competencies, and in order to preserve
consistency of interpretation and application, the Com-
mission has strengthened its central role under the new
7 Council Reg.1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on
competition laid down in Arts 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003]
O.J. L1/1.
8 On May 1, 2004. Until then Reg.17 stays in force.
9 See, e.g. Summary of Observations on White Paper on Reform
of Reg.17, February 29, 2000. Available at www.europa.eu.int/
comm/competition/antitrust/others
10 See European Parliament Report on the Commission White
Paper for Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Arts 81 and
82 of the EC Treaty (COM(1999) 101–C5–0105/1999/2108
(COS). Final A5–0069/1999 of November 30, 1999, and Opin-
ion of Economic and Social Committee on the Commission
Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Implementation of the
Rules on Competition Laid Down in Arts 81 and 82 of the Treaty
[2000] O.J. C365; [2001] O.J. C155/14.
11 Case C–344/98 Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd [2000]
E.C.R. I–11369.
Regulation.12 The establishment of such hierarchy of
regulatory powers between enforcers is desirable in
decentralised system because it presents a structural pro
for coherent application.
The next consideration concerns the degree of central-
isation: how much power should be entrusted to the
central body? The appropriate answer to this question
must make a reference to the Treaty objectives and
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality outlined
under Art.5.
Article 3(1)(g) provides that the Treaty objectives
include a creation of internal market with a system of
undistorted competition. From the statistical evidence
and reference to inefficiencies of the present system, it is
obvious that these objectives were not well served.
Hence, the very purpose of the new Regulation is to
facilitate the achievement of these objectives through the
mechanisms enhancing the efficiency in protection of
free competition in internal market.13
One of the indispensable mechanisms includes the
increase in central powers. As far as this author is
aware, compatibility of the new Regulation with the
principle of proportionality has not been contested. In
addition, I argue that the Commission powers indeed
increase in absolute terms but not from the point of view
of relative values. Namely, along with an increase in the
Commission’s powers, the standard of judicial control
over the actions of the Commission is expected to
correspondingly increase from self-imposed limited
jurisdiction to normal standard judicial review.14 This
implies that at the Community’s institutional level the
Commission acquires even greater level of responsibility
in the exercise of its powers than it has had under the
system of Reg.17.
The new Regulation, furthermore, serves the principle
of subsidiarity better than the system under Reg.17
because it ensures that the action takes place at the most
efficient level, with the Commission acting only in cases
involving Community interest15 or having effect on
intra-Community trade.16
It follows from the above that as long as the Commu-
nity action efficiently serves the Treaty objectives at the
same time paying due regard to the principles of pro-
portionality and subsidiarity, any degree of central-
isation is appropriate, justified and legal. The high
degree of centralisation in the Commission under the
new Regulation corresponds to this formula, because it
is meant to ensure, in a legal way, the level of con-
sistency necessary to provide for the effective attainment
of Treaty objectives.
Sole law and policy maker
. . . the Commission, entrusted by Art.85(1) of the EC
Treaty with the task of ensuring the application of the
principles laid down in Arts 81 and 82 of the Treaty, is
responsible for defining and implementing Community
competition policy.17
In the new directly applicable exception system,
national courts and authorities are required to interpret
and apply the Community competition law in accor-
dance with the existing legislation, the Court’s case law
and administrative decisions by the Commission. They
are also required to take into consideration Commission
notices and guidelines. The new Regulation intends to
keep the sole power to develop the competition policy
through legislative proposals and block exemption reg-
ulations, as well as through soft law instruments and
decisions, centralised in the Commission. As one com-
mentator noted, ‘‘ensuring consistency is much easier
with the same system of law’’.18 Therefore, although
applied by means of parallel competencies, the law and
policies will be directed from the centre, which will help
maintain consistency in the system.
Different forms of law and policy-making under the
new Regulation
(a) Block exemption regulations
Under the new Regulation policy and law making
powers take different forms. One of them is the adop-
tion of block exemption regulations applicable to all
types of agreements. Due to such general applicability
the Commission sees them as a ‘‘main tool to ensure the
consistent application of the law throughout the single
market and legal certainty for undertakings’’.19 The
application of Arts 81 and 82 of the Treaty will be
12 This is the right derived from the Treaty Art.83(2)(d), as well
as the duty of the Commission in its role of a guardian of the
Treaty. This Article confers the power on the Community
legislator to define the respective functions of the Commission in
applying the provisions of the article.
13 See Explanatory Memorandum to Commission Proposal for
Reform [2000] O.J. C365/12.
14 See para.33 of the new Regulation.
15 For clarification of the concept see Case T–24/90 Automec
Srl v Commission [1992] E.C.R. II–2223.
16 Explanatory Memorandum, p.11.
17 Case C–344/98 Masterfoods, para.[46].
18 See speech by Giuliano Marenco, on Joint Conference of the
European Commission and the European Parliament, ‘‘The
Reform of the European Competition Law’’ Freiburg, November
9 and 10, 2000. Available at:
19 Explanatory Memorandum, p.15.
subject to these block exemption regulations, creating
safe harbours for categories of agreements.
The Commission however may withdraw the benefit
of a block exemption regulation where the conditions
cease to be compatible with its requirements.20 This
power also ensures transparency in the enforcement of
competition policy. The undertakings will know exactly
what kinds of practices are exempted by virtue of block
exemption regulation as well as what practices make
them no longer compatible with it, so the question of
whether or not to benefit from block exemption will be
entirely a matter of their decision.
National enforcers are not empowered to modify the
effect of the block exemption regulations so to confer a
benefit on the agreements that otherwise do not qualify
for it. They may, however, withdraw the benefit of block
exemption in respect of their Member State territory.21
Mechanisms designed to ensure legal certainty in the
exercise of this power will be discussed later in the
second part of this article.
(b) Commission decisions in individual cases
Policy will be dictated also through the Commission
decisions in individual cases.22 Decisions finding inap-
plicability of Art.81,23 which must be distinguished
from former individual exemption decisions because of
their declaratory nature, will be taken only in excep-
tional cases to clarify the policy where the Community
public interest so requires and only on Commission’s
own initiative. The concept of public interest involves
the cases raising new, previously undecided points of
law, which therefore need to be clarified.24 This will
enable the Commission to give a direction to the
implementation of the law, and provide for transpar-
ency of the rules. Within the network of competition
authorities, and with a view to preserve consistency, the
Commission has sole power as to adoption of such non-
infringement individual decisions.
Infringement decisions in individual cases25 will be a
major operative part in the system of ex post enforce-
ment and their main function will be to protect the
competition. They will also play an important role in
establishing precedents, and due to the Commission’s
refocused resources, they number is expected to grow.26
Infringement Commission decisions clarify policy and
position on certain issues, and as such, they will cer-
tainly contribute towards increase in legal certainty.
All of the Commission decisions have the effect of
Community acts within the meaning of Treaty’s
Art.249, and bind in their entirety those to whom they
are addressed. They do not bind the national courts and
authorities the way judgments of Community Courts
do, but at best provide substantial guidance in reaching
a decision. Critics argue that this will create incon-
sistency and decrease legal certainty in decentralised
system, given that national enforcers are allowed to
adopt contrary decisions to those of Commission. The
present author, however, argues that, whereas Commis-
sion decisions indeed lack the binding effect de jure,
they will have such effect de facto.
De facto binding effect will be entailed, inter alia, by
one main consideration. Article 16 of the new Regula-
tion imposes a duty on national courts and authorities
to avoid contradicting Commission decisions and deci-
sions contemplated by the Commission. While it was
still in form of proposal, this duty, under the draft
Art.16, resulted from the principles of loyalty under
Art.10 of the Treaty and the principle of uniform
application. The very idea of being under the duty to
avoid the conflicting decision, interpreted as meaning
that Commission decisions do not in fact bind the
national enforcers, is intellectually unsatisfactory, espe-
cially because it was deemed to result from the binding
provision of Art.10 of the Treaty.27 If the Commission
indeed intended to leave any space for discretion and
make its decisions non-binding, it would have chosen
another wording, for example, ‘‘national enforcers are
under the duty to take into consideration Commission
decisions’’. The title of Art.16 ‘‘Uniform application of
Community competition law’’ further supports this
author’s argument, as it reflects the endeavour of the
Commission to preserve the uniformity by means of a
duty imposed therein. Provision of the Art.16, therefore,
de facto imposes an equivalent of a duty not to adopt
conflicting decisions on the Member States courts and
authorities.
In addition, ‘‘the Commission is entitled to adopt at
any time individual decisions under Art.81 of the Treaty,
even where an agreement or practice has already been
the subject of a decision by a national court and the
decision contemplated by the Commission conflicts with
that national court’s decision’’.28
20 See Art.29(1) of the new Regulation.
21 See Art.29(2) of the new Regulation.
22 See Arts 7–10 of the new Regulation for different types of
decisions that can be taken by Commission.
23 See Art.10 of the new Regulation.
24 See para.14 of the new Regulation.
25 Art.7 of the new Regulation.
26 White Paper, p.31.
27 The fact that the duty was deemed to result from the
principles of loyalty under Art.10 of the Treaty and the principle
of uniform application is a good indicator of the intention of
Commission, which shouldn’t be ignored and forgotten just
because it no longer forms a part of the Art.16.
28 Case C–344/98 Masterfoods, para.[48].
(c) Notices and guidelines, legislative proposals
Besides development of the policy through decisions in
individual cases, the right to propose legislative texts
also rests solely with the Commission. Notices and
guidelines will serve the purpose of explaining policies
(especially those of economic nature) and providing
guidance as to the application of the Community com-
petition rules.29 Although these soft-law instruments do
not formally bind national authorities30 they are
expected to make a valuable contribution to the con-
sistent application of the law, as the Commission would
confirm the approach set under those instruments when
adopting individual decisions. If the Court upheld such
individual decisions, relevant rules in soft law instru-
ments would become binding on the national author-
ities. Soft law instruments are also meant to improve the
transparency of the competition policy and provide
guidance to both, national enforcers and private par-
ties.31 The exclusive Commission powers to propose
legislative texts will also dictate the way in which a new
competition culture will develop, through shaping the
binding rules and clarifying the specific ideas behind the
new Regulation.
Mechanism of Article 3
Furthermore, Art.3 of the new Regulation makes sure
that in the proceedings before national courts or com-
petition authorities where trade between Member States
is affected Community law applies alongside the
national laws. Given the supremacy of Community over
national laws this Article also implies the exclusion of
national provisions contradicting those of the EC in
competition cases. National enforcers will be required
to apply Community law in cases where application of
national laws could lead to inconsistency with Commu-
nity rules. This eliminates legal uncertainty coming out
of concurrent application of national and Community
law and directly contradicts fears of renationalisation.
At the same time primacy of Community rules effec-
tively ensures that the very legislation and policies
Commission adopts become applicable and, when
needed, corrective instruments to cases affecting inter-
state trade. Article 3, hence, renders the Commission’s
central role in policy making meaningful. In the line
with the rest of the reform, the aim of this Article is to
ensure the necessary degree of efficiency and coherence
in the internal market. Together with centralised policy-
making, the adoption of this provision can be expected
to contribute towards consistency to a marked degree,
and given the framework of the new Regulation, in the
long run produce a high level of convergence between
national laws of the Member States.
Conclusion
There can be no watertight distinction between the first
and the second part of the argument in this article. The
evidence of high centralisation of powers is not confined
to policy-making but it extends throughout the system
in other means of vertical control, for example, in
strengthening the Commission’s regulatory powers. The
following paragraphs will discuss the different instru-
ments of information and cooperation envisaged under
new Regulation. Besides the fact that they serve the
function of co-ordination in the network of enforcers
and give the Commission wide regulatory discretion,
they are also designed to preserve consistency and
transparency of enforcement.
Old and new mechanisms as guarantors for
uniform and transparent application
Means of vertical control and co-operation in the
network of administrative enforcers
The Commission places a great confidence in co-opera-
tion through building a network with national competi-
tion authorities and believes that this is what will
ultimately strengthen the coherence of enforcement. The
adoption of decentralised application, however, requires
stronger co-operative mechanisms and stronger control
in the network. With the aim of preserving consistency
in the network, information and discussion are the main
means of co-operation envisaged. They will contribute
towards understanding of the rules with the long-term
effect of creating high level of consistency and the ad
hoc effect of allowing the Commission to correct possi-
ble inconsistencies in enforcement of Community com-
petition rules.
(a) Information
With a view to preventing conflicting decisions, the new
Regulation retains the provision imposing on the
administrative enforcers a duty of close co-operation.32
29 White Paper, p.31.
30 It is further argued in this article that they have an indirectly
binding effect under the new system regardless of subsequent
adoption of the Commission decisions.
31 On October 10, 2003 the Commission has published the so
called ‘‘Modernisation Package’’ [2003] O.J. C243/3, which
includes a number of notices and guidelines clarifying the rules
under new Regulation. 32 See Art.11(1) of the new Regulation.
Accordingly, on matters which require scrutiny from the
centre (that is have effect on intra-Community trade)
and in order to ensure consistency, national competition
authorities are to inform Commission of any initiation
of proceedings in cases in which they act under the
Treaty Arts 81 and 82.33 They are also to inform the
Commission of any intention to withdraw the benefit of
a block exemption, accept commitments or take
infringement decisions.34 This double information
requirement will enable the Commission to have an
overview of all the cases affecting intra-Community
trade dealt with by any member of the network.
In the White Paper the Commission expressed a view
that provision of this kind of information will help
maintain the consistency of competition policy enforce-
ment.35 The confidence to maintain the consistency
through information mechanisms was interpreted by
some authors as implying that the Commission envis-
ages telling the national authorities its view on the
matter and expecting them to comply.36 In the case of
non-compliance the Commission will deal with the case
itself using the corrective instrument of Art.11(6) to
withdraw the case from the jurisdiction of national
authorities, the same way it does under Art.9(3) of
Reg.17 at the present.37 This power of Commission is
presumed to pressure the national authorities to comply
with its view in the first place.38 Although this possibil-
ity existed before, the Commission did not use it, as
there has not been much conflict in the past. Based on
this fact it is possible to assume that conflicts will not
occur in the future either, especially because national
competition authorities will become a part of the more
integrated network pursuing common goals under the
guidance of the Commission.
Furthermore, in practice, information forwarded to
the Commission will be made available also to all other
members of the network, which will prove especially
useful in the context of the new Art.13. This Article
creates a mechanism regulating allocation of cases in the
network of competition authorities meant to avoid
parallel proceedings and enhancing a one-stop shop
principle. As cases may be brought simultaneously or
successively before more than one authority, it provides
a legal basis for all public enforcers to suspend the
proceedings if the case is, or has been previously dealt
with by another authority in the network. The Commis-
sion will handle cases involving sufficient Community
interest, whereas other cases will be allocated inside the
network of national authorities to the best placed
authority based on criteria of effects within the terri-
tory.
The provision of Art.13 has non-compulsory charac-
ter and it may happen that national authorities disagree
as to which one is the best placed to deal with a case. In
accordance with the principle of close co-operation they
should try to settle the disagreement by discussion, and
in accordance with the principle of legal certainty this
discussion should be a subject to transparent time-limit,
some have suggested a period of three months, for
ultimate allocation. If the discussion however does not
produce a workable solution within the prescribed time-
period, the Commission will have to interfere in order to
preserve efficiency in dealing with cases. It will have at
least three available options: allocate the case to the
authority where it considers best placed; decide to
conduct parallel proceedings on the basis that both
jurisdictions have sufficient connecting factors and that
it is the most effective way of solving the competition
problem; or withdraw a case from the jurisdiction of
national authorities by means of Art.11(6) and deal
with it itself. The last option will probably apply where
there are more than two authorities involved in the
dispute so the parallel proceedings would be inefficient,
and allocation to a single authority would be an ineffec-
tive way to deal with the case.
(b) Discussion
Discussion in the network will also be of great impor-
tance for consistency. In the Explanatory Memorandum
the Commission recognises that development and appli-
cation of Community competition law is a matter that
concerns all authorities and states that ‘‘policy issues
will be the subject of discussion within the network’’.39
The new Regulation therefore strengthens the role of the
Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Domi-
nant Positions, a consultative body to be composed of
members of competition authorities of the Member
States. Hence, in adopting block exemption Regulations
the Commission is required to consult the Advisory
Committee twice in the process. A consultation meeting
with the Committee presided over by the Commission
member will take place before adoption of all decisions
by the Commission (save the interim measures) and the
opinion it produces will be appended to the draft
33 See Art.11(3) of the new Regulation.
34 See Art.11(4) of the new Regulation. Note that national
authorities are not empowered to take positive decisions that
further reduce the risk of divergent decisions.
35 See para.105.
36 See Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law:
Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford UP, New York, 2001),
p.1027.
37 By initiating own proceedings the Commission withdraws
the jurisdiction from national authorities. This is also in line with
the European Court of Justice case law.
38 See Jones and Sufrin, p.1027. 39 See Explanatory Memorandum, p.12.
decision and published on the request of the Committee.
If the Commission so decides, or if the Member State so
requests, a case dealt with by national authority may be
put on agenda too. Outside the forum, the national
authorities may consult the Commission and ask for its
assistance in all cases involving application of Commu-
nity law. Discussion of this kind should greatly contrib-
ute towards understanding of, and willing compliance
with, the centrally adopted legislation and central guid-
ance in general which is a type of co-operation the
Commission hopes for with a view to strengthening
uniform enforcement.
Co-operation with national courts
Moreover, the new Art.6 specifically confers a power to
apply Art.81(3) of the Treaty onto the national courts.
Most critics, however, considered national courts an
unsuitable forum for application of the complex eco-
nomic assessments that this Treaty provision requires. In
this respect some commentators noted that the role of
the national courts would not be substantially different
as they have already been applying Arts 81(1) and 82.40
The judgment of the Court in Delimits illustrates that
the role of national courts will, indeed, not significantly
change under the proposed system. In that case the
Court emphasised that where an agreement before the
national courts clearly infringes Art.81(1) of the Treaty
and will, in their opinion, not benefit the Commission
exemption under Art.81(3), national courts are free to
rule on incompatibility of an agreement.41 It means that
even in the present system of enforcement courts are
required to make assessments under Art.81(3) of the
Treaty, regardless of the lack of power to apply its
provisions. Furthermore, it has been argued that the
application of Art.82 of the Treaty, in respect of which
national courts have full jurisdiction, is at least as
difficult as the application of Art.81 is to exemption
provisions.42 United States judges have been applying
full economic assessments of competition cases for the
last 100 years, and there is no reason to believe that they
are more capable of performing this task than their
European counterparts.43 In the words of the President
of the Brussels Commercial Court, Belgian courts are
‘‘very well placed to make use of the possibility to apply
directly Art.81(3) of the Treaty’’.44
In the course of judicial proceedings in which Com-
munity competition law is applied, the Commission may
request national courts to transmit to them all docu-
ments that are necessary.45 It will use such information
to intervene in national judicial proceedings in the role
of amicus curiae and submit its observations where it
considers guidance of that kind will help maintain the
consistency of enforcement. In any case, national courts
are to forward to the Commission a copy of all judg-
ments made under Arts 81 and 8246 in order to enable
its possible intervention on appeal to the higher national
court.47 Similarly to the argument made above concern-
ing the provision of Art.16, although labelled not
binding, it can be expected that the Commission submis-
sions to the national courts will have a quasi-binding
effect in practice.
It has to be pointed out that when national authorities
apply Community law, they have to do so in accordance
with the practices and position of Commission. In a way
they would have to submit to the Commission’s view if it
was to disagree.48
If this statement is true in the case of national
authorities, it must of necessity be true in the case of
national courts as well. The same requirement to apply
the rules in accordance with the practice and position of
the Commission is imposed on the courts. The submis-
sion of observations in the role of amicus curiae cer-
tainly does constitute such position of the Commission,
notwithstanding the principle of judicial autonomy.
Where the national court however, intends to adopt a
decision contrary to the position of the Commission in
the role of amicus curiae, it is very likely that it will first
refer a case to the Court under the preliminary rulings
procedure.49
All competition decisions by national authorities and
all pending proceedings before national courts in the
Community may potentially lead to the use of this
40 See, e.g. Alban O. Salord, ‘‘Concurrent Application, the April
1999 White Paper and the Future of National Laws’’ [2000] 2
E.C.L.R. 136.
41 See the judgment in Case C–234/89 Delimitis v Henninger
Bra¨u [1991] E.C.R. I–935; [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 210, paras
[43]–[55].
42 See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, ‘‘The Modernisation of Anti-
trust Policy: A Legal and Cultural Revolution’’ 37 C.M.L.Rev.
585.
43 Speech of Mario Monti, the Commissioner in charge for
Competition Policy, ‘‘Towards the application of Art.81(3) by
National Courts’’ Conference at the Europaa¨ische Rechtakade-
mie, Trier, November 27, 2000.
44 See speech by Anne Spiritus-Dassesse, Freiburg, 2000.
45 Art.15(3) of the new Regulation. The courts are obliged to
respond to such request.
46 Art.15(2) of the new Regulation.
47 Also, the copy of judgments will enable Commission to
receive useful information on national markets of the Member
States.
48 See Salord, [2000] 2 E.C.L.R. 134.
49 This procedure is outlined in Art.234 of the Treaty.
procedure. Depending on the remedies sought, com-
plainants have a choice of bringing their case before
national authorities or national courts, or, where the case
involves sufficient Community interest, before the Com-
mission. A party dissatisfied with a decision of a national
competition authority may complain to the national
courts responsible for judicial review of such admin-
istrative decisions. Any court within the meaning of
Art.234 of the Treaty may make use of preliminary
rulings,50 whereas courts against whose decisions there is
no judicial remedy (courts of last instance) are required
to make a reference to the Court.51 Although not the
most efficient way of deciding a case, this procedure will
successfully serve the purpose of ensuring uniformity.52
Together with the envisaged intervention in judicial
proceedings it should eliminate all serious concerns
about inconsistency resulting from the divergent applica-
tion of Community law by national courts.
The Commission nevertheless has provided for train-
ing for national judges in order to prepare them for
upcoming tasks.53 Such special training should further
reduce the possibility of divergent decisions and should
raise awareness of the role of the courts in the new
system. Moreover, under the new Art.15(1), where the
judge dealing with the competition issue under Commu-
nity law finds it difficult to make necessary assessments
it may request assistance from the Commission. Where
the problem concerns interpretation of the law it may
refer the question to the Court. It will be hard in practice
to bypass these mechanisms and create a possibility of
inconsistency, in particular given the role of the Com-
mission in the new system.
Instruments compensating absence of harmonised
procedural rules
Unlike the case of substantive law, the Commission has
not envisaged either co-operation with regard to con-
sistent application of procedural rules or harmonisation
of procedural rules. Article 5 of the new Regulation
specifically provides that national authorities are to
apply the sanctions available under national laws when
effecting decisions for infringement of Arts 81 and 82 of
the Treaty. This provision applies to the courts as well.
Some critics went so (irrationally) far as to claim that
‘‘differences between national rules on procedure may
obstruct the target of a coherent application of Art.81
even more then differences in substantive rules’’.54 Oth-
ers expressed the view that differences in procedural
rules give incentive to the complainants to ‘‘shop’’ for
the court or authority where procedures are quicker and
remedies more attractive, and lead to renationalisation
of Community competition law. The following para-
graphs will respond to these critics.
(a) Regarding forum shopping
Article 3(1)(h) of the Treaty provides that the approx-
imation of national laws shall go only so far as required
for the effective functioning of the common market.
This Article prohibits the Community legislator to
impose a level of harmonisation that is higher than
necessary for the achievement of common market objec-
tives for, as such, it would conflict with the principle of
proportionality. The present author shares the view of
the Commission that procedural harmonisation is not
necessary for the uniform application of the law.
The general principle in the Community requires
national remedies to be so deterrent to provide for the
full effectiveness of the Community rules.55 In addition,
the administrative principle of proportionality provides
that sanctions imposed should not be excessive in
relation to the breach. These two principles set the lower
and the upper limits to the level of national sanctions.
Although not strictly defined, the limits do ensure that
the range of fines cannot substantially differ between
jurisdictions so to encourage forum shopping.
Should this prove not enough, co-operation in the
network requires the cases to be allocated to the best
placed authority according to the criteria of effects
within the territory. The information circulating within
the network will make sure that cases reach the most
appropriate forum. When supported with envisaged
‘‘one-stop shop’’ control this will make it impossible for
the complainants to select what is in their opinion the
most lenient authority. Instead, the system will take care
50 See Case 166/73 Rheinmu¨hlen [1974] E.C.R. 33, where the
Court held that ‘‘national courts have the widest discretion in
referring matters to the Court of Justice if they consider that a
case pending before them raises questions involving interpreta-
tion[ . . . ]necessitating a decision on their part.’’
51 Art.234 of the Treaty. This provision is subject to acte clair
theory developed by the Court in Case 283/81 Cilfit [1982]
E.C.R. 3415, according to which last resort courts do not have to
make reference under Art.234 where the correct application is so
obvious as to leave no space for any reasonable doubt. A special
procedure exists for contesting the final and formal decisions of
the Commission directly before the Court. See the procedure of
action for annulment under Art.230 of the Treaty.
52 Concerns that related to the lack of common appeal author-
ity have failed to take account of this procedure.
53 More on training available at: www.eubusiness.com/funding/
competition/comp01_en.htm
54 Basedow, Jurgen, ‘‘Who Will Protect the Competition in
Europe? From Central Enforcement to Authority Networks and
Private Litigation,’’ [2001] 2 European Business Organisation
Law Review, pp.443–468.
55 See Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kauman [1984] E.C.R.
1891.
to allocate the complaints and choose the proper forum
for them.
The concerns about forum shopping are probably
much more related to private than to public enforce-
ment as no mechanisms for allocation of cases exists
with regard to private litigation. However, logic leads to
the assumption that due to lack of culture as to private
litigation, there will be very few cases brought before the
national courts in the initial period. In the meanwhile,
until such culture develops, it can be expected that this
specific concern will be subject to clarification and
regulation through subsequent measures.56
Finally, the only consideration that might promote
forum shopping in general is that of inconsistency in the
application of Community law. As this paper demon-
strated, a high level of centralisation and instruments of
vertical regulation and co-operation in the system are
capable of preventing or correcting all possible incon-
sistencies. Therefore, the application of different
national procedures will not, as such, prevent the con-
sistent application of Community substantive rules,57
directly providing a disincentive as regards forum
shopping.
(b) Regarding renationalisation
The decentralisation lacking harmonised procedural
rules was deemed, inter alia, as a danger leading to
renationalisation. In the light of arguments made above
concerning consistency of application, procedural rules
are in themselves incapable of constituting a danger of
renationalisation.
The Commission’s role of guidance in the network is
expected to have a great influence on the enforcement of
Community law by national authorities. Not only will
the co-operation enhance the consistency of application:
national authorities will become a part of the same
system together with the Commission in pursuance of
common goals related to accomplishment of the internal
market. As recognised, ‘‘when the authorities apply the
same rules within the framework of a network they will
individually be less vulnerable to political pressures,
leading to a better protection of competition’’.58
It has also been argued that the aim of the reform is
not to establish a system in which national authorities
are turned into national extensions of Commission.59
The present authors believe that whereas it may not be
the aim, it certainly is the effect of the reform. Decentr-
alisation under the new Regulation is intended to
increase the application of EC law and not of national
antitrust rules.60 As a result of close co-operation envis-
aged under Art.11, supported by the provision of Art.3,
national laws will eventually converge and will be
substituted with Community laws in the long run.61
This will render the national authorities mere branches
of the Commission helping the enforcement of Commu-
nity competition law.
Transparency under the new Regulation
Among submissions of other observations, industry was
in particular concerned that the discontinuation of prior
notification and authorisation procedure as well as lack
of detailed rules under the new Regulation would result
in a loss of transparency.62 This fear is unfounded
because, under the system of Reg.17, legal uncertainty
already exists hence the present author believes that the
new Regulation will in fact advance the transparency of
the rules to a high degree.
(a) Discontinuation of ex ante control
Due to its non-binding character, the Reg.17 practice of
informal settlements by comfort letter, which accounts
for more than 80 per cent of total decisions, does not
provide legal certainty to undertakings. The Commis-
sion may at any time withdraw the benefit of a comfort
letter,63 and they also do not provide any protection to
the undertakings before the courts.64 Moreover, in this
system companies must examine their position not only
under Community law, but under each of the laws of the
Member States affected by the agreement. They might
be a subject of parallel proceedings on national and
Community level and a subject of concurrent applica-
tion of the national and Community law. Proceedings
before national authorities can be blocked the moment
the undertaking under investigation notifies the restric-
tive agreement to the Commission, which decreases
transparency for complainants.
56 In fact, the Commission has included a draft Notice on
Complaints in its ‘‘Modernisation Package.’’ See n.31.
57 Also argued by Mario Todino, ‘‘Modernisation from the
Perspective of National Competition Authorities: Impact of the
Reform on Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law’’
[2000] 8 E.C.L.R. 349.




60 See speech by Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Freiburg, 2000.
61 That the substitution will happen was also argued by Salord
[2000] 2 E.C.L.R. 141.
62 See Summary of Observations, p.14.
63 See Cases T 7 & 9/93 Langnese-Iglo & Scho¨ller Lebensmittel
v Commission [1995] E.C.R. II–1533, and Case C–279/95P
Langnese-Iglo v Commission [1998] E.C.R. I–5609.
64 In Case C–234/89 Delimits v Henninger Bra¨u, [1991] E.C.R.
I–00935, the Court held that the national courts may not rely on
a Commission comfort letter stating its view that the agreement
Furthermore, when filling in the A/B Form for prior
notification of the restrictive practices in the present
system, companies first assess the likelihood of exemp-
tion before deciding whether or not to notify an agree-
ment. Undertakings will always make a decision not to
notify when they consider that an agreement cannot be
exempted.65 Besides the fact that such agreements
restrict free competition, this is also proof that com-
panies know exactly how to make an assessment of
compatibility under Community competition rules. The
concerns of industry are therefore unfounded.
The new Regulation will in fact strengthen legal
certainty and increase transparency in many respects.
Companies will be required to observe the rules by
making their own assessment of compatibility and as
pointed out ‘‘there is no reason why competition law
should be any different from other legal areas where
companies have to make sure that they are acting in
compliance with the law’’.66 Where the law, however,
appears unclear or where the undertakings engage in
transactions raising new points of law, the Commission
will issue a reasoned opinion stating its view on the
matter. The reasoned opinions envisaged under the new
Regulation will have strong influence on the judges and
courts, even greater than comfort letters do under the
present system.67 National courts and authorities are
under a duty to apply the law in accordance with the
practice and position of the Commission, and reasoned
opinions, in law and in fact, do amount to such practice
and position.
Moreover, the possibility of parallel proceedings has
been decreased by the new Art.13 that gives national
authorities and the Commission the right to suspend
proceedings or reject a complaint if the same case is, or
has been dealt with, by another competition authority.
The decentralisation of application of Art.81(3) of the
Treaty and the abolishment of the notification system,
no longer makes it possible for undertakings to use
dilatory notifications and block the national proceed-
ings. The new Art.3 eliminates the possibility of applica-
tion of inconsistent national rules to cases affecting
intra-Community trade. Therefore, the system envis-
aged under the new regime will in fact lead to an
increase in transparency and not the other way
around.
(b) Lack of detailed rules under the new
Regulation
While the new Regulation was still at the level of
proposal some of the criticisms related to insufficient
and imprecise rules. The envisaged adoption of sub-
sequent legislation, of which the Commission has
already made use, provides an answer to such critics. It
would have been premature and politically unwise on
the part of the Commission to have created very detailed
rules at that point.68 The proposal needed to receive an
approval in the Council and many detailed rules would
have just increased the subjects for debate. It would
have been equally unwise from the legal point of view.
Critics have ignored the fact that the imperfections of
the new system cannot and should not be solved in
advance through theoretical assessment of impacts of
the new Regulation. Instead, it is much wiser to wait for
the practical experience gained after entry into force of
the new Regulation to show practical problems,69 which
can be dealt with through the issue of subsequent
legislation. The rules are therefore carefully designed to
provide a sufficiently precise framework and clear ideas
to allow space for clarification based on the practical
needs. As already indicated, the inconsistencies that may
appear will be of transitory nature, and in that initial
period the Commission will have to make a full use of its
regulatory powers.
Conclusion
The mechanisms outlined above will enhance a ‘‘level
playing field’’ throughout the Community and provide
undertakings with a greater level of legal certainty. They
will also insure a level of consistency needed for effective
functioning of the proposed directly applicable excep-
tion system. In this respect, ‘‘instruments of consistency
must be seen as aiming not at a deadly uniformity but at
ensuring that the system remains viable for undertakings
and that sound competition policy is applied at the end
of the day’’.70 This is the acknowledgement of a fact of
life rather than intelligent anticipation: there are no
deadly uniformities in this world and a certain level of
inconsistency will have to remain in spite of the estab-
lishment of well designed mechanisms.
The following argument relates to the inconsistency
and legal uncertainty surrounding enforcement of anti-
trust law in the US system. It is meant to illustrate that
the remaining possibility of inconsistent enforcement in
65 This claim can be based on the statistical fact that in 40 years
of enforcement the Commission took only 9 negative deci-
sions.
66 See speech by Charlotte Cederschio¨ld, Freiburg, 2000.
67 See Ehlermann, 37 C.M.L.Rev. 574.
68 This was also recognised by Claus D. Ehlermann, Freiburg,
2000.
69 See Claus D. Ehlermann, 37 C.M.L.Rev. 582.
70 See speech by Guiliano Marenco, Freiburg, 2000.
period of post-modernisation in the Community is
incapable of constituting a threat to the effective func-
tioning of the proposed system.
Inconsistencies and legal uncertainties in US
system of antitrust enforcement
General
The US antitrust system has been in existence since the
adoption of the Sherman Act in 189071 and has been the
first jurisdiction in the world to adopt a modern system
of competition law. It is therefore often taken as an
authoritative example by the nations developing or
instituting new competition regimes. In this respect the
Community is no different. European competition law
has been compared to the US model ever since its
creation. The fact that the new Regulation adopts
fundamental changes that resemble certain features
inherent in the US system has given an additional reason
for such comparison. Many commentators have been
frustrated with the way in which the Commission points
out that the adoption of rules similar to that of the
United States will increase competitiveness of European
companies to the highly competitive level of US com-
panies.
I would argue that if US companies are competitive, it is
despite the system [ . . . ]. I keep asking myself, why does
Europe need to ape the unfortunate model of the US with
all its uncertainties and difficulties.72
Indeed, whereas it might be true that the US model
has successfully operated under the same framework of
rules for more than 100 years this does not imply that it
has been consistent. The issue of inconsistency and legal
uncertainty surrounding the US competition system
today is highlighted in the paragraphs below. But first it
is necessary to turn briefly to the basic legal and
institutional framework of antitrust.
Brief overview of the US antitrust laws and
enforcement agencies73
The Sherman Act of 1890 was passed by the US
Congress, which means that it is a part of federal law.
Section 1 of the Act deals with restrains on trade and
reads as follows:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several states, or with foreign nations
shall be considered illegal.
The Act does not define the meaning of restraints on
trade. This provision has therefore been the subject of
interpretation by the Supreme Court. Both federal laws
and the interpretation by the Supreme Court are not
binding on the states.74
States have their own antirust statutes. All 50 states
and the District of Columbia have enacted antitrust
legislation. The statutes differ among the states: whereas
some have enacted legislation modelled on federal acts
many states have not done so. Due to its non-binding
effect it is also possible that they might interpret the
look-alike statutes as well as federal law differently.
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are the
authorities in charge of federal antitrust enforcement.
The DOJ is the sole authority entrusted with enforce-
ment of the Sherman Act. It acquires jurisdiction over
cases affecting inter-state trade. The FTC was created by
the Federal Trade Commission Act. Section 5(a) of this
Act prohibits unfair methods of competition, and unfair
and deceptive acts or practices in commerce. The FTC is
not in charge of enforcing the Sherman Act, but the
courts have held that s.5 is broad enough to cover any
acts that might be found illegal under Sherman Act as
well.
State antitrust enforcement relates to the cases that
have a predominantly local or regional effect. State
Att.–Gens have a power to enforce the federal antitrust
laws. However, they may bring suites under both federal
71 An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce against Unlawful
Restraints and Monopolies, 15 USC, July 2, 1890. It was
supplemented by the latter statutes, the Clayton Act 1914, the
Federal Trade Commission Act 1914 and the Robinson-Patman
Act 1936.
72 See, e.g. speech of Stephen Walzer, Freiburg, 2000.
73 For more information on the following para.see also: Jones
and Sufrin, pp.18–27, Ehlermann, Claus D., and Loraine L.
Laudati (eds.), ‘‘Federalism in Antitrust Enforcement: The United
States’ Experience with a Dual Enforcement Regime’’ in Robert
Schuman Centre Annual on European Competition Law 1996
(Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp.205–226 available at and
speech by James F. Rill, ‘‘Recent Trends and Developments in the
Role of Federal and State Authorities in Antitrust Enforcement:
Is Cooperation Working?’’ in European University Institute,
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2000 EU Com-
petition Workshop Proceedings (Florence, Italy). Available at
74 For e.g. Supreme Court in Lousiana held that the US Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Sherman Act is to be considered
persuasive but not binding, in case Lousiana Power and Light v
United Gas Pipe Line, 493 So. 2d 1149, 1158 (1a. 1986).
and state antitrust statutes. They also may bring suits on
behalf of their citizens to challenge restrictive conducts
under federal law. A lot of cases today brought by state
Att.-Gens are pursued in conjunction or co-operation
with similar federal action. Certain relief may be
obtained by the states under state laws that are not
available under federal law. This creates an incentive for
the Att.-Gens to apply concurrently national and federal
laws, which is, as obvious from the portrait above, just
one of the sources of inconsistency in the US system.
Inconsistency and legal uncertainty in the
enforcement
During the past 15 years the states have emerged as
significant participants in the enforcement of US anti-
trust law. ‘‘One of the dangers most frequently cited as
potentially arising from increased enforcement activity
of the states is the creation of uncertainty generated by
inconsistent enforcement.’’75 State and federal enforce-
ment contain big differences as regards both substantive
and procedural laws on which they are based. The most
dangerous consequence of dual enforcement, as viewed
by some commentators, is the development of multiple
standards of prosecutorial discretion, conflicting sub-
stantive standards and inconsistent precedents. At the
extreme, the uncertainty imposed by these differing
standards may prevent businesses from undertaking
‘‘efficiency-enhancing transactions’’.76 Finally, dual
enforcement creates a duplication of effort by federal
and state authorities, which results in waste of
resources.
Hence, the uncertainties surrounding the undertak-
ings operating in the US market today are a product of
multiple scrutiny and inconsistent dual enforcement
regime. One author was particularly concerned with the
question of double jeopardy, coming out of concurrent
application, which in the United States actually serves
the purpose of preserving state sovereignty.77 He pre-
sented the argument as follows:
The Fifth Amendment forbids double jeopardy. How-
ever, the Supreme Court judgment in criminal cases78
provided that dual system of enforcement did not
constitute double jeopardy because different prosecu-
tions were taken by different sovereign states and the
Fifth Amendment was not created to prevent overlap in
jurisdictions. This rule applies by analogy to antitrust
cases even when the effect is on inter-state trade and
should be a matter of federal law. The same conduct
thus may be guilty of and punished for infringement of
different laws. Although state law cannot authorise
what federal law forbids, it may forbid what is author-
ised on a federal level.79 It may also sanction what has
already been forbidden at the federal level. As the
author of this argument pointed out, what interest in
prosecution can the state have when the FTC finds a
breach of federal law and, for example, makes a cease
and desist order?80 Finally, he concluded that there is an
inherent problem of legal uncertainty in antitrust cases,
as the undertakings have to assess the validity of state
rules against the federal rules in order to see if there is a
conflict. At the end of the day, they must comply with
both rules.81
Even more surprising for the present author, however,
is the way in which the problem of inconsistency is (not)
addressed as if it was just an insignificant detail in the
system. The US Supreme Court judgment in the case of
Cantor v Detroit Edison illustrates this indifference
towards inconsistency as well as lack of clear rules on
distribution of powers. In that case the Supreme Court
held that:
merely because certain conduct may be subject to both
state regulation and to federal antitrust laws does not
necessarily mean that it must satisfy inconsistent stan-
dards, but even assuming inconsistency, this would not
mean that the federal interests must inevitably be subordi-
nated to the states.82
In this kind of system one would expect that the
co-operation between different enforcers would be on
the high level. But the reality is far from that, as will be
indicated in the following paragraph.
Modifications to the system
Proposed solutions for the problems of inconsistent
application of law in the US system of antitrust enforce-
ment is experiencing include the following: there must
be steps taken at both levels of government in order to
75 See Ehlermann and Laudati (eds.), Robert Schuman Centre
Annual on European Competition Law 1996, p.13.
76 ibid.
77 Salord [2000] 2 E.C.L.R. 129.
78 Namely, Abbate v United States 359 US 187 (1959) and
Bartkus v Illinois 359 US 121 (1959).
79 Similar to the Community practice on block exemptions, and
the retention of the exclusive power to adopt positive admin-
istrative decisions by the Commission under the new Regula-
tion.
80 p.130. Salord believed that it is about compensating for the
expenses incurred during prosecution of violation.
81 From this it follows that if their business activities are a
subject to more then one state’s jurisdiction they will have to
comply with more then two sets of laws depending in how many
states they pursue their activities.
82 Supreme Court of the United States judgment in Cantor,
DBA Selden Drugs Co v Detroit Edison Co 428 US 579.
ensure that the enforcement does not jeopardise the
competitiveness of US companies through the imposi-
tion of excessive burdens. To do this, state and federal
authorities should strive to co-ordinate enforcement
policies and efforts. The closest to the co-operation that
they have besides the submission of amicus curiae briefs
is exemplified in the formation of the Executive Work-
ing Group for Antitrust and the development of Com-
mon Ground Conferences. The latter merely serves as a
place where the federal and state antitrust enforcement
authorities compare their notes on substantive areas.
The former is composed of representatives from each
level of enforcement, which co-ordinates overlapping
enforcement activities to prevent duplication of effort
(obviously without success), which means that it is
aimed towards managing the resources. Through sub-
mission of briefs federal or state regulators are afforded
the opportunity to present their views without generat-
ing the burden associated with initiating separate pro-
ceedings. Also this mechanism is aimed towards
reducing budget.83
Despite the efforts to decrease the costs many com-
mentators consider the system very inefficient and
wasteful as to use of resources.84 Overlapping jurisdic-
tions and the possibility of parallel proceedings are
indeed a waste of resources, but in the light of more
serious concern they present a constant and confirmed
threat that the federal and state authorities will reach
divergent decisions. One member of the American Bar
Association committee therefore called for a new legisla-
tion designed to pre-empt state laws in cases dealing
with restraint on commerce between several states. A
new protocol between the Justice Department, FTC and
the states for allocation of antitrust cases is suggested to
help save resources and have only one authority deal
with the case, which would increase legal certainty.85
New Regulation in Europe: a well-learned lesson
from the US experience
Following this analysis of the problems that the under-
takings in the US system face it is now useful to turn
back to the European Council’s new Regulation. At the
start it must be recognised that the new Regulation goes
a full step ahead in relation to the situation in the United
States, not only in the development of brand new
instruments for consistency, but also in already estab-
lished institutional and legal arrangements86 on which it
is based. In other words, everything that the US system
needs in order to ensure consistent application and offer
legal certainty, the post-modernised Community system
will have. And more.
Namely, the envisaged mechanisms, such as alloca-
tion of cases to the best placed authority; the circulation
of all relevant information through the network; the
duty to consult the Advisory Committee before taking
decisions imposed on the Commission and the equiva-
lent duty to inform the Commission imposed on
national authorities at the outset of proceedings as well
as prior to taking the decision; the influence that the
amicus curiae briefs will have on national courts, cen-
tralised policy-making, high level of Commission reg-
ulatory powers and especially the power to withdraw a
case from the national authorities, the obligation under
the new Art.16 to avoid conflicting decisions; the possi-
bility of consulting the Commission on how to deal with
cases, and finally the elimination of inconsistent applica-
tion by means of the new Art.3, will all guarantee a
higher level of legal certainty and a higher level of
consistency as compared to the US system. Furthermore,
when the new Regulation is considered in the light of
existing supranational institutional structures in the
Community, harmonisation of substantive law on com-
petition, and the prospective for further developments,
one has to ask the question: what exactly were the critics
so concerned about?
Conclusion
Despite the chaotic picture on inconsistency and legal
uncertainty presented in this section, it remains the truth
that the US antitrust system has inspired many other
legal systems and has had a long and effective record of
dealing with restraints on competition. The possible
problems with incoherent enforcement of laws, dual
system and lack of legal certainty as to interpretation of
federal law has not disintegrated the system or inter-
fered with the high level of competitiveness on the
market. Likewise, it is the system that has developed a
83 See also speech by James F. Rill, Florence, 2000.
84 See article by Chaney, Helen, ‘‘Why State Antitrust Enforce-
ment is a Bad Policy’’ July 16, 2001. Available at www.pacific
research.org/pub/act/2001/act_01-07-16.html
85 For protocol on Federal/State Co-operation see www.ftc.gov/
ftc/antitrust.htm
86 Here it might be useful to keep in mind the fundamental
difference in the US and the Community antitrust policies. It
seems that the US system takes far more care of preserving state
sovereignty when adopting competition policies than about
devising the most efficient way of protection of competition. On
the other hand, the protection of free competition is the one of
the basic tools for attainment of the Community objectives
related to the internal market. It is therefore one of the basic
pillars for the very existence of the Community and it is only
natural to conclude that as such it will be far better protected in
the Community than in the United States.
lot of new economic and competition concepts and
theories, and it is famous for its unique teachings in the
area.87 Many features of the new regime reflect the
current practice in the United States.88 However, in the
context of the European framework for enforcement
under the new Regulation they will have more far-
reaching effects in ensuring uniformity then the same
practices could ever have under the structures of the US
system. This proves that not only will the Community’s
modernised system confine itself to the level of con-
sistency and legal certainty indispensable for function-
ing, but it will go even further to induce the convergence
in the Member States’ systems that will pave the way for
more efficient attainment of the common market
objectives.
Conclusion
The reform of the Community antitrust rules is an
intelligent project that will most certainly see pay-offs in
the form of efficient and uniform application of the law.
Not everyone would agree with this statement. The
exclusive power to grant exemptions to the restrictive
agreements and practices that has rested with the Com-
mission for the last 42 years was perceived as a safe
harbour for companies, decentralisation of which
would result in incoherent enforcement of Community
law. Critics further claimed that where such decentral-
isation is accompanied by discontinuation of the prior
administrative authorisation, as in the case of the new
Regulation, the risk of incoherent application and loss
of legal certainty is even greater. This article proved that
such risk is not capable of undermining the functioning
of the system in the post-modernised Community. Cen-
tralised policy-making, aided by the provision of Art.3
of the new Regulation, effectively ensures that all courts
and authorities apply the Community law uniformly
with the position of the Commission. Furthermore, the
new mechanisms of information and co-operation with
the strong characteristic of vertical control, provides an
increased legal certainty and effective solution to all
concerns related to consistency of application. The US
system of antitrust enforcement was not only an exam-
ple but also an authority that illustrated that certain
gaps in the consistency of application are not the threat
to the otherwise well co-ordinated system, directly
proving the weakness and exaggeration of critics. It also
provided a useful comparison to the Community’s new
regime. As it appeared, the new Regulation contained all
the necessary tools to eliminate any concerns related to
inconsistency when compared to the experience in the
US system. Those who maintain, against all the evidence
to the contrary, that the inconsistency under the new
Regulation will cause serious problems in enforcement
are usually those who under the mask of honest concern
protect their national or personal interests.
87 Teaching of the Chicago and Harvard school are often cited
as authorities on economic/competition matters.
88 Amicus curiae interventions, business review letters, decentr-
alisation, ex post enforcement etc.
